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Abstract: I distinguish two roles for a fitness concept in the context of explaining 
cumulative adaptive evolution: fitness as a predictor of gene frequency change, and 
fitness as a criterion for phenotypic improvement. Critics of inclusive fitness argue, 
correctly, that it is not an ideal fitness concept for the purpose of predicting gene-
frequency change, since it relies on assumptions about the causal structure of social 
interaction that are unlikely to be exactly true in real populations, and that hold as 
approximations only given a specific type of weak selection. However, Hamilton took 
this type of weak selection, on independent grounds, to be responsible for cumulative 
assembly of complex adaptations. In this special context, I argue that inclusive fitness 
is distinctively valuable as a criterion for improvement and a standard for optimality. 
Yet to call inclusive fitness a criterion for improvement and a standard for optimality 
is not to make any claim about the frequency with which inclusive fitness 
optimization actually occurs in nature. This is an empirical question that cannot be 
settled by theory alone. I close with some reflections on the place of inclusive fitness 
in the long running clash between ‘causalist’ and ‘statisticalist’ conceptions of fitness. 
 




1. What do we want from a fitness concept? 
 
For neo-Darwinians, the evolution of complex adaptation is a gradual process. Complex traits 
do not pop into existence fully formed; they are assembled via the accumulation of small 
improvements. Darwin (1859), in a famous passage on the origin of the eye, expresses this 
idea powerfully and beautifully: 
 
If we must compare the eye to an optical instrument, we ought in imagination to take a thick layer of 
transparent tissue, with a nerve sensitive to light beneath, and then suppose every part of this layer to 
be continually changing slowly in density, so as to separate into layers of different densities and 
thicknesses, placed at different distances from each other, and with the surfaces of each layer slowly 
changing in form. Further we must suppose that there is a power always intently watching each slight 
accidental alteration in the transparent layers; and carefully selecting each alteration which, under 
varied circumstances, may in any way, or in any degree, tend to produce a distincter image. We must 
suppose each new state of the instrument to be multiplied by the million; and each to be preserved till a 
better be produced, and then the old ones to be destroyed. In living bodies, variation will cause the 
slight alterations, generation will multiply them almost infinitely, and natural selection will pick out 
with unerring skill each improvement. Let this process go on for millions on millions of years; and 
during each year on millions of individuals of many kinds; and may we not believe that a living optical 
instrument might thus be formed as superior to one of glass, as the works of the Creator are to those of 
man? (Darwin, 1859, pp. 188–189) 
 
Most models in population genetics do not attempt to model this process. They focus instead 
on changes in allele frequency over what is, comparatively speaking, a shorter timescale: the 
timescale of so-called microevolution. A number of authors have noted the disconnect 
between the microevolutionary timescale of most population genetics models and the longer 
timescale over which complex adaptations are cumulatively assembled (Eshel and Feldman, 
1984, 2001; Neander, 1995; Hammerstein, 1996, Eshel et al., 1998; Godfrey-Smith and 
Wilkins, 2009; Metz, 2011). Over the short term, evolution by natural selection leads to 
equilibria that are stable given the alleles currently competing in the population, but that may 
eventually be destabilized by the appearance of novel mutants. Cumulative adaptive 
evolution occurs over many successive episodes of short-term allele frequency change, as one 
novel mutant responsible for a small improvement arises by chance and spreads through the 
population, eventually followed by another, and another, and so on, in a process memorably 
described by Dawkins (1996) as ‘climbing Mount Improbable’.  
 
The timescale of cumulative adaptive evolution is clearly a longer timescale than that of 
microevolution to a short-term stable equilibrium, but nor are we talking here about the 
timescale of macroevolution (Gould, 2002; Sterelny, 2007), since these changes are typically 
still occurring within a single species. Metz (2011) and Godfrey-Smith (2012) have suggested 
the term mesoevolution for this intermediate timescale. We might also call it, less technically, 
the evolutionary medium term. 
 
In the context of explaining the cumulative, step-by-step assembly of complex adaptation 
over the medium term, what explanatory roles do we want a fitness concept to play? I suggest 
there are two main roles. First, we want a fitness concept to help us predict, within a single 
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microevolutionary step, the trajectory of the population through gene-frequency space. If the 
bearers of a mutant allele B are currently fitter, on average, than the bearers of a wild type 
allele A, it should be the case that B will (probably, allowing for drift) increase in frequency 
relative to A. If all alleles present in the population are currently such that their bearers are, 
on average, equal in fitness, it should be the case that, for the moment at least, natural 
selection does not alter allele frequencies.  
 
Second, and perhaps less obviously, we want a fitness concept to provide a stable criterion, 
throughout the whole cumulative process, for what constitutes an improvement to an 
organism’s whole phenotype. In other words, a fitness concept should tell us, whenever a 
novel mutant appears, whether or not that mutant has improved the organism’s phenotype 
relative to the wild type. To play this role, fitness must be a property, X, of an individual 
organism such that new mutant phenotypes are systematically selected-for (in the sense of 
Sober, 1984) over the wild type if and only if they make a positive causal contribution, in 
contrast with the wild type, to X. A fitness concept that provides a criterion for improvement 
also provides a standard for optimality: roughly speaking, we can say that a phenotype is at 
least locally optimal when there is no more room for improvement. 
 
The relationship between these roles—predictor of gene-frequency change and criterion for 
phenotypic improvement—is a subtle one.1,2 A good predictor of gene-frequency change is 
not necessarily a good criterion for improvement, because a good criterion for improvement 
has to be a property of an individual organism, not of an allele or a genotype. Moreover, a 
good criterion for improvement has to apply at every stage in a multi-step process of 
cumulative adaptation, and therefore has to deliver reliably correct verdicts as to what 
selection will favour despite changes over time in the environment, the composition of the 
population, and the particular phenotypic differences that selection is targeting at any given 
moment. A good predictor of gene-frequency change will not necessarily be well suited to 




 The distinction maps imperfectly on to Sober’s (2001) well-known distinction between the ‘two faces of 
fitness’. The ‘predictor’ role is reminiscent of Sober’s ‘mathematical predictor’, while the ‘criterion for 
improvement’ role is perhaps, at first sight, reminiscent of Sober’s ‘ecological descriptor’. However, the 
distinction I have in mind derives from consideration of different timescales in a process of cumulative 
adaptation, not mathematics vs. ecology. The notion of a criterion for improvement can be given a mathematical 
representation; indeed, as I explain in Sections 4 and 5, I see this as an attractive way of understanding the 
concept of inclusive fitness. 
2 The distinction may also, at first sight, call to mind Mills and Beatty’s (1979, p. 275) distinction between 
‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ fitness, where the former notion refers to an organism’s expected number of 
immediate offspring and the latter refers to the number of descendants it leaves after some specified number of 
subsequent generations (e.g. its number of grandoffspring, or great-grandoffspring). Despite the superficially 
similar terminology, Mills and Beatty’s distinction cross-cuts mine. A good predictor of gene-frequency change 
may sometimes have to take into account numbers of grandoffspring, etc. (as in, for example, sex ratio models), 
whereas a good criterion for phenotypic improvement may sometimes still be ‘short-term’ in the sense of 
neglecting grandoffspring, etc., in cases in which effects on later generations are not relevant to the direction of 
selection-for. 
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For a simple example, consider the exponential growth rate of a genotype, or ‘Malthusian 
parameter’ (Fisher, 1930; Charlesworth, 1970; Crow & Kimura, 1970). This is a commonly 
seen fitness measure in population genetics, and a useful one for predicting and explaining 
changes in gene frequency. Yet it makes no sense to say, of a series of small changes to a 
complex phenotype, that they qualify as improvements by virtue of increasing their bearer’s 
exponential growth rate. A growth rate in this sense, being a property of a genotype or allele 
rather than an individual organism, is not an intelligible criterion for whole-phenotype 
improvement. 
 
Conversely, a good criterion for phenotypic improvement need not be an especially good 
predictor of gene-frequency change. As noted above, it must be such that, in a process of 
cumulative adaptation, mutants are systematically selected-for over the wild type if and only 
if, relative to the wild type, they make a positive causal contribution to it. It will therefore not 
be irrelevant to the prediction of gene-frequency change. But it need not deliver exact, 
accurate, quantitative predictions. It is enough that it delivers reliably correct qualitative 
verdicts about the direction of selection-for. It may be able to do this while making various 
approximations that limit its predictive power. Moreover, it need only apply in the special 
context of a process of cumulative adaptation. It may therefore make assumptions which are 
valid in that context, but which limit its usefulness outside that context. 
 
These considerations bear directly on the status of one of the most contested fitness concepts 
in evolutionary theory: Hamilton’s concept of inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964, 1970). It is 
hard to explain to non-specialists the strength of feeling this concept evokes. To its critics, 
such as Nowak, Wilson and colleagues, it is an arcane, obsolete construct, based on lazy 
approximations and implausible assumptions, that holds back progress in the field (Nowak et 
al., 2010; Wilson, 2012; Allen et al., 2013). To its defenders, such as Gardner and West, it is 
the insight of a genius, and an essential concept for understanding social adaptation (Gardner, 
2009, 2017; Gardner et al., 2011; West and Gardner, 2013).  
 
My argument in this paper is that we can better understand the nature of this disagreement, 
and the way forward, by distinguishing the two roles for a fitness concept outlined above. As 
a predictor of gene-frequency change, inclusive fitness as Hamilton conceived it is valid only 
in special cases, and typically only as a first-order approximation. Therefore, if one starts 
with the assumption that a fitness concept should be an exact, quantitative predictor of gene-
frequency change in as many cases as possible, it becomes hard to see the value of inclusive 
fitness. The concept comes into its own, however, as a criterion for phenotypic improvement 
in the context of the cumulative assembly of social adaptations. For this reason, it would be a 




2. Inclusive fitness as a predictor of gene-frequency change 
 
Inclusive fitness is, at first sight, a strange quantity. Here is how Hamilton (1964) defined it: 
 
Inclusive fitness may be imagined as the personal fitness which an individual actually expresses in its 
production of adult offspring as it becomes after it has been stripped and augmented in a certain way. It 
is stripped of all components which can be considered as due to the individual’s social environment, 
leaving the fitness he would express if not exposed to any of the harms or benefits of that environment. 
This quantity is then augmented by certain fractions of the quantities of harm and benefit which the 
individual himself causes to the fitness of his neighbours. The fractions in question are simply the 
coefficients of relationship. (Hamilton, 1964, p. 8) 
 
For Hamilton, inclusive fitness was, first and foremost, a property of an individual organism. 
We can, of course, talk of the mean inclusive fitness of a population, or of the bearers of a 
particular trait. But these are derivative notions: the fundamental notion is a property of an 
individual (cf. Pence and Ramsey, 2015). It also an inherently causal notion: a weighted sum 
of the effects on reproductive success for which the focal organism is causally responsible 




Inclusive fitness is committed, at a conceptual level, to the validity of an additive causal 
model of fitness (Birch, 2016a). The procedure Hamilton describes in the above paragraph 
involves crediting components of reproductive output to the actors whose social behaviour 
was causally responsible for them, rather than crediting them to the organisms that actually 
produced the offspring. For example, the larvae produced by a queen in a social insect colony 
should be credited not to the queen but to the workers who rear them. If this procedure is to 
avoid problems of double-counting, it must be that the reproductive success of an organism 
can be written as a sum of components, each of which is attributable to the social behaviour 
of a single social actor. Let us call this assumption fitness additivity. Moreover, it must be 
that the value of each component depends only on the genotype of the actor, and not on the 
genotype of the recipient, an assumption known as actor’s control (Grafen, 2006).  
 
The reliance of inclusive fitness, as Hamilton defined it, on fitness additivity and actor’s 
control is something even its most committed defenders should acknowledge, and at least 
some of them do. Grafen (2006, p. 544), for example, writes that ‘the question of how to 
define inclusive fitness in the absence of additivity has not been settled, and so fundamental 
theory on the non-additive case can hardly yet begin’. 
 
Critics of inclusive fitness argue, plausibly, that these assumptions are unlikely to be exactly 
true in real evolving populations (Nowak et al., 2010; Allen et al., 2013; Allen and Nowak, 
2016). Consider, for example, a genotype that disposes its bearer to produce an alarm call 
(Queller, 1985). In so doing, it reveals the organism’s location to nearby predators, reducing 
its ability to benefit from the alarm calls of others. In this scenario, the benefit of receiving an 
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alarm call does not just depend on the behaviour (and genotype) of the actor. It also depends 
on a fact about the recipient’s behaviour (i.e. whether or not the recipient has also produced 
an alarm call) that is dependent on its genotype. Actor’s control is violated.  
 
A more formal way to put the problem is to say the alarm call has second-order effects on 
reproductive output. Suppose the wild type strategy is to produce an alarm call with 
probability zero on seeing a predator (i.e. never), and that this is competing against a mutant 
strategy that produces an alarm call with probability q. Possessing the mutant strategy rather 
than the wild type imposes a viability cost on the actor proportional to q, and confers a 
viability benefit proportional to q on each recipient. These are its first-order effects. But if a 
recipient itself possesses the mutant strategy, there will also be a second-order effect, 
proportional to q2, that at least partially cancels out the benefit to that recipient, because an 
organism which produces an alarm call is less able to reap the benefit of an alarm call 
produced by others. It is this second-order effect—an effect that depends on the genotype of 
both actor and recipient—that makes trouble for the actor’s control assumption. 
 
Defenders of inclusive fitness should accept this too. Fitness additivity and actor’s control are 
strong assumptions; they are unlikely to be exactly true in real populations. Again, Grafen 
(2006, p. 543) acknowledges this, writing, for example, that ‘the assumption of additivity is 
made throughout this paper, but is not in general a realistic assumption. In many applications, 
non-additivity is an important part of the problem.’ Critics of inclusive fitness may reply, 
with some justification, that this point is absent from some of the more forthright defences of 
inclusive fitness, such as Abbot et al. (2011).3 
 
This, however, is not the end of the story. Defenders of inclusive fitness have often noted that 
its assumptions can be justified as first-order approximations if we assume a specific form of 
weak selection, usually known as δ-weak selection (Grafen, 1985, 2006; Wild and Traulsen, 
2007). To assume δ-weak selection is to assume that the character of interest is a quantitative 
character, and that the alternatives competing in the population are a wild type and a mutant 
that differs only very slightly from the wild type. For example, a δ-weak selection model of 
an alarm call scenario might pit a wild type strategy in which an organism makes an alarm 
call with probability q against a mutant strategy in which an organism makes an alarm call 
with probability q + δ, where δ is a very small increment such that δ2 ≈ 0 (Wild and 
Traulsen, 2007). 
 
With this assumption in place, we can reinterpret inclusive fitness in terms of marginal or 
differential causal effects rather than total causal effects. That is, instead of defining an 
	
3 There are certainly ways to formulate Hamilton’s rule so that it works without assuming actor’s control; see 
the discussions of ‘HRG’ in Birch (2014, 2017a, b) and Birch and Okasha (2015). But Hamilton’s rule is a 
population-level statistical result, and it should be distinguished from inclusive fitness, which Hamilton clearly 
conceptualized as a property of an individual organism. A criterion for improvement must be a property of an 
individual organism, and inclusive fitness qua property of an individual organism indispensably relies on an 
additive causal model of reproductive success (Birch, 2016a). 
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actor’s inclusive fitness as a baseline non-social component plus a weighted sum of the total 
effects of its social behaviour on reproductive success, we instead define an actor’s inclusive 
fitness as a baseline component that includes all the effects of the wild type, to which we then 
add a weighted sum of the differential effects of its actual behavioural phenotype on 
reproductive success, relative to a default scenario in which the actor expresses the wild type 
behaviour. On this marginal interpretation, fitness additivity and actor’s control can be 
reinterpreted as assumptions about marginal effects: what is assumed is that the marginal 
effects of expressing the mutant phenotype rather than the wild type are additive and actor 
controlled. 
 
The result is that the assumptions that initially seemed too strong become reasonable as 
approximations. To illustrate these points let us return to our alarm call example. The original 
problem was that making an alarm call reduces the benefit an organism receives from an 
alarm call expressed in others, leading to a violation of actor’s control. But now consider the 
marginal effect of making an alarm call with probability q + δ rather than probability q, for 
some very small increment δ. This will have a first-order marginal effect (proportional to δ) 
on one’s own reproductive success and a first-order marginal effect on the reproductive 
success of nearby recipients. It will also have a second-order effect (proportional to δ2) on the 
benefit one receives from a marginal increase in the probability with which another nearby 
individual makes an alarm call. However, this second-order effect, which is the source of the 
trouble for the actor’s control assumption, is precisely the kind of effect that the assumption 
of δ-weak selection entitles us to regard as approximately zero, since it relies on the product 
of two tiny phenotypic differences. 
 
To put the point more formally, let B denote the first-order benefit conferred by an alarm call 
on a recipient, let –C denote the first-order cost, let –D denote the reduction in the benefit that 
accrues to the recipient when it has itself produced an alarm call, and let r denote the 
coefficient of relatedness between actors and recipients. The marginal effect of the mutant 
phenotype on the actor is – δC. The marginal effect of the mutant phenotype on a recipient 
who possesses the wild type strategy is δB, and the marginal effect on a recipient who also 
possesses the mutant strategy is δB – δ2D. However, on the assumption that δ2 ≈ 0, the 
marginal effect is approximately δB regardless of the genotype of the recipient. The second-
order effect disappears, actor’s control is restored, and we can write the overall marginal 
effect of the strategy on the actor’s inclusive fitness as rδB – δC. 
 
 
3. Why weak selection? 
 
To critics of inclusive fitness, this appeal to δ-weak selection seems ad hoc: to justify two 
questionable assumptions, we invoke another assumption that appears no less questionable. 
Why think that selection is usually δ-weak? Why think it is ever δ-weak? It may even seem 
rather absurd: why go to such trouble to show that inclusive fitness delivers approximately 
accurate calculations of gene-frequency change under a narrowly circumscribed range of 
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conditions, when other, simpler fitness measures, such as an organism’s personal 
reproductive success, can deliver exact calculations under a wider range of conditions 
(Nowak et al., 2010; Allen et al., 2013)? However, I maintain that this move is neither ad hoc 
nor absurd. It is fairer, I think, to see it as an assumption grounded in some important 
background commitments of inclusive fitness theory—commitments that can be traced back 
to Hamilton, but which critics of inclusive fitness do not necessarily share.   
 
At the heart of the Hamiltonian tradition is a version of adaptationism that takes complex 
adaptation, or ‘organism design’, to be the explanatory target of social evolution research 
(Gardner, 2009, 2017; Grafen, 2014). This is combined with an empirical commitment to a 
gradualist picture of how complex adaptation arises. Fisher (1930), a major influence on 
Hamilton, took complex adaptation to result from the gradual accumulation of mutations with 
tiny phenotypic effects.4 Fisher posited small-effect mutations on the grounds that large-
effect mutations are much less likely to cause adaptive improvements. In support of this, he 
offered two iconic arguments: one involving an informal analogy with a microscope, the 
other involving a more formal geometric model (Fisher, 1930, pp. 38-41).   
 
To paraphrase (and simplify) the informal argument, suppose you are attempting to focus a 
microscope by turning an adjustment knob. Knowing nothing of microscopes, you have no 
idea which way to turn the knob, so you turn it in a random direction. If the adjustment is 
very small, there is a 50% chance it will improve the focus, because any very small 
adjustment in the right direction will help. But the larger the adjustment gets, the lower the 
probability it will be an improvement, because it becomes ever more likely that an 
adjustment, even if it happens to be in the right direction, will overshoot the target.   
 
Using a geometric model in which a population is displaced from the optimum in phenotypic 
space and must find its way back to the optimum through random gene substitutions, Fisher 
showed that the probability of an improvement, which falls off with the size of the 
adjustment even in the one-dimensional case, falls off more rapidly in the case of an 
adjustment in two dimensions, and falls off very rapidly indeed when we are adjusting at 
random in many dimensions, as in the case of a mutation that affects many aspects of the 
phenotype. The chance of improvement is greatest, at 50%, for a mutation that affects the 
phenotype by an infinitesimal amount.  
 
Fisher’s argument has not been without its critics. Kimura (1983) argued that, in finite 
populations, mutants with larger effects on the phenotype have a greater chance of going to 
fixation, because mutants with small effects are prone to drifting out of existence. Orr (1998) 
showed that both Fisher and Kimura could be partially vindicated in relation to different 
	
4 Darwin was also a gradualist about complex adaptation, as shown clearly by the passage quoted at the start of 
this article. However, it would be tendentious to project on to Darwin the whole package of Fisher’s views about 
the typical strength of selection and the typical effect size of adaptive substitutions. Darwin, knowing little about 
the mechanisms of inheritance, at times appears to invoke very strong selection as a way of preserving adaptive 
phenotypes in the face of erosion by blending inheritance (Lewens, 2010a). 
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stages of the process of cumulative adaptation: the typical effect size of a mutation fixed at an 
early stage in the process, when the phenotype is far from the optimum, is much larger than 
Fisher thought; but, as the phenotype gets closer to optimality, Fisher's concern about 
‘overshooting’ becomes increasingly salient and the typical effect size of a fixed mutation 
becomes progressively smaller. 
 
But although Fisher’s argument remains a source of debate (for more recent contributions, 
see Waxman and Welch, 2005; Martin and Lenormand, 2006), what matters for our purposes 
is that a commitment to Fisherian gradualism is at the heart of Hamilton’s theory of social 
evolution. Consider, for example, the following credo from Hamilton’s collected papers:    
 
I was and still am a Darwinian gradualist for most of the issues of evolutionary change. Most 
change comes, I believe, through selected alleles that make small modifications to existing 
structure and behaviour. If one could understand just this case in social situations, who cared 
much what might happen in the rare cases where the gene changes were great and happened 
not to be disastrous? Whether under social or classical selection, defeat and disappearance 
would, as always, be the usual outcome of genes that cause large changes. I think that a lot of 
the objection to so-called ‘reductionism’ and ‘bean-bag reasoning’ directed at Neodarwinist 
theory comes from people who, whether through inscrutable private agendas or ignorance, are 
not gradualists, being instead inhabitants of some imagined world of super-fast progress. Big 
changes, strong interlocus interactions, hopeful monsters, mutations so abundant and so 
hopeful that several may be under selection at one time—these have to be the stuff of their 
dreams if their criticisms are to make sense. (Hamilton, 1996, pp. 27-28). 
 
Thus a focus on δ-weak selection is grounded in the core commitments of Hamilton’s 
program. The subset of selection processes for which inclusive fitness is a valid fitness 
concept is the same subset Hamilton and his successors take, on independent grounds, to be 
responsible for the cumulative assembly of complex adaptations. 
 
 
4. Inclusive fitness as a criterion for improvement 
 
For all this, critics may still be bemused: the fact that inclusive fitness delivers at least 
approximately accurate calculations of gene frequency change under δ-weak selection does 
not give it any advantage over other predictively accurate fitness concepts, even granting the 
point that δ-weak selection is type of selection with special evolutionary significance. The 
question remains: why not use a simpler fitness concept, such as personal reproductive 
success, that does not require us to assume weak selection or neglect second-order effects? 
Bemusement of this sort is palpable in the writings of Nowak and colleagues (Nowak et al., 
2010; Allen et al., 2013).  
 
This is where the second role for a fitness concept becomes important. In the context of 
explaining cumulative adaptation, we want a fitness concept that can serve as a criterion for 
phenotypic improvement. As explained in Section 1, a criterion for improvement is a 
property, X, of an individual organism such that new mutants are systematically selected-for 
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over the wild type if and only if they make a positive causal contribution (in contrast with the 
wild type) to X. I contend that the distinctive advantage of inclusive fitness over other fitness 
concepts is that it is a particularly good candidate for property X.   
 
Consider, for example, a process of social evolution in which natural selection gradually 
shapes various different aspects of a complex social strategy involving the conditional 
expression of different actions in different contexts. In one context, C1, the strategy produces 
actions that benefit the actor; in another context, C2, the strategy produces actions that confer 
benefits on genetically related recipients. Mutants periodically arise (one at a time) that alter 
some aspect of the strategy very slightly, implying δ-weak selection.  
 
Suppose natural selection targets different aspects of the phenotype at different times: the 
strategy is initially shaped by selection for enhanced benefits for the actor in C1, then goes 
through a stage in which it is shaped by selection for greater benefits conferred on genetically 
related recipients in C2, and then finally goes through a streamlining stage in which the cost 
to the actor of conferring benefits on relatives in C2 is gradually reduced. A more realistic 
scenario would involve the shaping of all these aspects of the phenotype as and when relevant 
mutants arise, but for the purpose of fixing ideas it helps to think to selection targeting 
different aspects in discrete stages. 
 
In such a process, the actor’s personal reproductive success is not a suitable criterion for 
improvement, because mutants that causally detract from this quantity are selected-for during 
the second stage. The personal reproductive success of the recipients is not a suitable 
criterion either, because mutants that may be neutral or deleterious with respect to this 
quantity are selected-for in the initial and final stages. An appropriate criterion for 
improvement must be more ‘inclusive’ than the personal reproductive success of any single 
organism. It must include the social effects of an organism’s behaviour on the reproductive 
output of other organisms, so that it counts mutants in the first and third stages as 
improvements by virtue of their actor-directed effects, and counts mutants in the second stage 
as improvements by virtue of their recipient-directed effects. It must therefore be a quantity 
that is appropriately sensitive to the reproductive success of both actor and recipient, 
weighting these quantities in such a way as to deliver accurate qualitative verdicts as to 
whether or not the mutant will be selected-for over the wild type. 
 
Inclusive fitness is that quantity. Provided selection is δ-weak, it provides the correct 
weighting of actor-directed and recipient-directed effects. All and only those mutants that 
causally promote (in contrast to the wild type) the inclusive fitness of the actor will be 
selected-for. Because inclusive fitness relies on assumptions that are only justified as 
approximations, it may not be the best fitness concept for calculating the precise magnitude 
of gene frequency change at any particular moment in time. But that is not the job we are 
asking it to perform. Its job is to produce correct verdicts regarding the direction of selection-
for: to be such that, throughout the entire medium-term process of cumulative social 
adaptation, all and only those mutants that causally promote it are selected-for.  
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The cumulative assembly of social adaptations by δ-weak selection thus constitutes a special 
context in which inclusive fitness is both valid and valuable. It is valid because its 
assumptions are reasonable as first-order approximations when selection is δ-weak. It is 
valuable because, unlike other fitness concepts, it provides a stable criterion, throughout the 
whole process, for what constitutes an improvement to the phenotype. 
 
 
5. Should we expect inclusive fitness to be optimized? 
 
This distinctive role for inclusive fitness as a criterion for improvement points to a close 
relationship between inclusive fitness and the concept of optimality, because a criterion for 
improvement implies a standard with respect to which the optimality (or suboptimality) of a 
phenotype can be judged. For social evolution researchers thinking about cumulative 
adaptation over mesoevolutionary timescales, it makes sense to conceptualize a locally 
optimal trait, within a specified set of alternatives, as one that leaves no room for further 
cumulative improvement under δ-weak selection, and it makes sense to conceptualize a  
‘suboptimal’ trait as one that does leave room for such improvement. Since, as I have argued, 
inclusive fitness provides the appropriate criterion for what constitutes an improvement, it 
also provides the appropriate standard for optimality. An optimal trait, within a set of 
alternatives, is one that at least locally maximizes inclusive fitness; a suboptimal trait is one 
that does not.    
 
On this point, my view to be well aligned with those of Grafen (2014), Gardner (2009, 2017), 
and West and Gardner (2013), all of whom emphasize the special role of inclusive fitness in 
explaining ‘organism design’. However, in calling inclusive fitness the criterion for 
improvement and the standard for optimality, I am not making any empirical claim that we 
should expect cumulative improvement to occur in any particular case, nor am I suggesting 
that we should expect optimality, approximate optimality, or anything remotely close to 
optimality, to be reliably achieved in natural populations. After all, there are numerous well-
known obstacles to cumulative improvement: if there is too much dominance or epistasis, if 
there is too much drift, if the environment changes too rapidly, or if the mutation rate is too 
high or too low, cumulative adaptation can stall or fail to get off the ground at all. 
 
Many of these obstacles are discussed by Godfrey-Smith (2009), who characterizes a 
‘paradigm’ Darwinian population as one in which cumulative adaptation is apt to occur, and a 
‘marginal’ Darwinian population as one that departs from a paradigm Darwinian population 
in one or more ways. The conditions for cumulative adaptation highlighted by Godfrey-Smith  
include the fidelity of transmission, the smoothness of the fitness landscape, and the strength 
of selection in relation to drift. It is worth noting here that selection can be strong in relation 
to drift even if selection is δ-weak, although the prospect of advantageous mutations drifting 
to extinction is particularly concerning under δ-weak selection, as noted by Kimura (1983) 
and discussed briefly above. 
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There can be no theoretical guarantee that these obstacles will ever be overcome in nature. 
When we find a phenotype that is approximately locally optimal among a range of variants, 
this provides some inductive evidence that the conditions under which the trait evolved were 
favourable to cumulative optimization (although tests of this sort should be performed and 
interpreted carefully; see Orzack and Sober 1994; Orzack and Sober 2001). But there can be 
no mathematical proof that the optimization of inclusive fitness is widespread, likely, or 
indeed ever instantiated in the natural world.    
 
Here I suspect I part ways with Grafen, who writes, for example, that the theoretical results of 
his Formal Darwinism project support ‘a very general expectation of something close to 
[inclusive] fitness maximization, which will convert into [inclusive] fitness maximization 
unless there are particular kinds of circumstances’ (Grafen 2014, p. 166). It is, admittedly, 
hard to discern the empirical commitments of such a hedged claim, and Grafen should not 
necessarily be read as asserting that the ‘particular kinds of circumstances’ to which he 
alludes are rare. However, one gets a general sense that Grafen, like many inclusive fitness 
theorists, regards cumulative optimization as a process that, on theoretical grounds, we 
should expect to occur frequently in natural populations, leading in many cases to at least 
approximately optimal outcomes.    
 
To explain why I am sceptical of this claim, a comment on Grafen's Formal Darwinism 
project is needed. The aim of the project is to derive mathematical links between a formal 
representation of natural selection (a version of the Price equation), and a formal 
representation of phenotypic optimality that uses the apparatus (borrowed from economics) 
of optimization programs. I find the project admirable and useful but do not think it has 
proved—or could prove—the above claim, or any empirical claim about the regularity with 
which we should expect the cumulative optimization of phenotypes to occur in nature.   
 
I have discussed the Formal Darwinism project on several occasions and I will not repeat 
these discussions here, although two concerns do merit repeating (Birch, 2014b, 2016b, 
2018). First, Grafen's framework involves an assumption of ‘perfect transmission, that is, no 
mutation, no gametic selection, fair meiosis, and that all contributing loci have the same 
mode of inheritance’ (Grafen, 2002, p. 77). The assuming away of mutation implies that his 
model (or ‘meta-model’) is one in which no cumulative adaptation can occur, so his formal 
links between gene frequency change and phenotypic optimality are results that are proven to 
hold only in a world in which no cumulative adaptation is possible (Birch, 2014b, 2016b). 
Second, Grafen's framework avoids making any assumptions about the genetic architecture 
underlying phenotypic traits, such as the absence of dominance and epistasis. It follows that 
his formal results would hold even in a world in which dominance and epistasis were 
ubiquitous, imposing severe genetic constraints on optimization (Okasha and Paternotte, 
2014; Birch 2014b). These two observations should lead us to doubt whether these formal 
results can be said to support a ‘general expectation of something close to inclusive fitness 
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maximization’, even in a qualified sense. In fact, they do not imply that inclusive fitness 
maximization will ever occur.     
 
There is a broader point to be made here: we should not overstate the ability of purely 
theoretical arguments to support empirical generalizations, no matter how hedged, about 
natural populations (Orzack, 2014). We can say that if a social adaptation has originated via 
the gradual accumulation of small-effect mutations under δ-weak selection, then inclusive 
fitness provides the appropriate criterion for improvement and the appropriate standard for 
optimality with respect to that adaptation. This points to an important and distinctive role for 
the concept of inclusive fitness. But we should add the qualification that, in such a case, the 
distance from optimality of the end product will depend on many different variables, 
including how readily small mutations arise, how reliably they are inherited, how constant 
they are in their average effects on the phenotype, how effective selection is at retaining them 
in the face of drift and other evolutionary processes, and how long the whole process of 
cumulative improvement has been able to operate in a sufficiently stable environment. These 
are empirical matters that no amount of theoretical work can settle. 
 
 
6. Fitness and causality 
 
In closing, I want to connect the foregoing discussion to a family of long-running debates in 
the philosophy of biology about the relationship between statistics and causality in 
evolutionary theory—debates in which the rival camps have come to be known as 
‘statisticalists’ and ‘causalists’. These debates were initiated in the early 2000s by Matthen 
and Ariew (2002), and Walsh et al. (2002), who argued that evolutionary theory should be 
interpreted as a statistical theory rather than a dynamical theory. I say ‘debates’ because this 
literature has tended to run together a variety of issues that, while not unrelated, can be 
usefully distinguished (Otsuka, 2016). These include the relationship between selection and 
drift; the question of whether natural selection should be regarded as a force, a cause, or 
merely as a statistical trend; the question of whether evolutionary models provide causal or 
non-causal explanations; and—most relevantly to the arguments of this paper—the question 
of whether fitness is a causal property of organisms or merely a statistical predictor of 
change.5 
 
On this last question, the arguments of this paper might be seen as providing some support to 
the causalist view. Inclusive fitness is, after all, an inherently causal property: a weighted sum 
of the effects a focal individual has on the reproduction of itself and others. It is a property of 
an individual organism, but not an intrinsic property: it is a property constituted in part by 
causal relations between the focal organism and its genetic relatives. Brandon and Ramsey 
(2007) have already noted that social evolution theory is a rich source of problem cases for 
	
5 Some notable contributions to these debates include Rosenberg and Bouchard (2005); Millstein (2006); 
Shapiro and Sober (2007); Walsh (2007, 2010); Matthen and Ariew (2009); Lewens (2010b); Otsuka et al. 
(2011), and Ariew et al. (2015). 
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those who deny a link between fitness and causality, since many models of social evolution 
rely on explicitly causal decompositions of fitness. My arguments here reinforce their point, 
and provide more insight into why causal notions of fitness are so deep-rooted in this area. 
 
Moreover, we can see that Hamilton’s decision to formulate inclusive fitness in explicitly 
causal terms was not an arbitrary or dispensable choice, but rather a way of enabling the 
concept to play the explanatory role of a criterion for improvement. Recall that a criterion for 
improvement is charged with reliably telling us the direction of selection-for during 
successive episodes of δ-weak selection. It should be a property of an individual organism 
such that all and only those mutant phenotypes that causally promote it, relative to the wild 
type, are selected-for over the wild type. Since the explanatory role for a criterion for 
improvement is specified in causal terms (‘causally promotes’, ‘selected-for’), it should not 
come as a surprise to find that the role is best fulfilled by an explicitly causal fitness concept.  
 
However, I would not interpret this as an unqualified victory for the causalist, because my 
arguments also undercut the idea of their being any unique fitness concept well suited to all 
explanatory roles. I have suggested that inclusive fitness earns its keep in social evolution 
theory as a criterion for phenotypic improvement, despite its limitations as a predictor of 
gene-frequency change.  This is an argument for pluralism about fitness concepts, not an 
argument for the superiority of inclusive fitness in all contexts. It is compatible with the most 
versatile and accurate predictors of gene-frequency change being statistical, non-causal 
properties of genotypes (recall here the example, from Section 1, of the Malthusian 
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CAPTION: Inclusive fitness. An individual organism’s inclusive fitness is a weighted sum of 
the effects of its behaviour on reproductive success. In this illustration, organism 1’s 
behaviour affects the reproductive success of itself and of organisms 2, 3, and 4 (as shown by 
the arrows; the shaded regions represent components of reproductive success caused by the 
behaviour of organism 1). Organism 1’s inclusive fitness consists of a baseline non-social 
component, plus the effect on its own reproductive success caused by its own behaviour, plus 
its effects on organisms 2, 3, and 4, weighted in each case by a coefficient of relatedness 
(Figure © the author, reprinted from Birch, 2017a). 
